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 A Note on First-Price Sealed-Bid Cattle 
Auctions in the Presence of Captive 
Supplies
John M. Crespi and Tian Xia
The authors present an analytical model of a ϐirst-price sealed-bid cattle auction 
in which a spot and coordinated markets are interconnected. The model reveals 
that the conventional wisdom that market coordination negatively affects the bid 
price in the spot market is an oversimpliϐication. The relationships between key 
market variables impact bids and bid shading in complex ways. While captive 
supplies can lead to lower spot prices, the price reductions do not necessarily stem 
from an increase in market power due to contracting. The model emphasizes the 
importance of several variables for future empirical studies.
Key Words: auction, captive supplies, cattle markets, contracting
Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005) argued that U.S. spot markets for cattle ought 
to be contemplated in the purview of a ϐirst-price sealed-bid auction because of 
how such cattle are sold. Generally, packers submit spot market bids to feedlots 
without knowing the amount of the bids made by other packers, and the 
highest bidder obtains the lot. Crespi and Sexton also argued that important 
idiosyncrasies in these markets make analytical models of bidding behavior 
difϐicult to derive. One impediment to the analysis is the existence of non-spot-
market cattle obtained by packers via contracting and other forms of vertical 
coordination. The terms contracting, captive supplies, and packer ownership 
are not entirely interchangeable, but captive supplies is used by producers as 
a catch-all term for any coordination that creates a separate, private market 
between a packer and a supplier. This is how we shall use the term captive 
supplies as well. 
There is no dispute among producers or economists that such non-spot 
markets inϐluence the spot market for fed cattle. A relatively traditional 
oligopsony model of two conjoined markets has been derived (Xia and Sexton 
2004), but an analytical model of bidding in a ϐirst-price sealed-bid auction in 
the presence of captive supplies has not. Rather than developing an analytical 
model, Crespi and Sexton (2004, 2005) focused on structural simulations 
of equilibrium bidding and empirical estimations of a probabilistic supply 
function. Thus, there is a signiϐicant gap in this literature, and incorporation 
of captive supplies is essential since it has a signiϐicant effect on returns 
for cattle producers and beef processors. Evidence of the grave importance 
of captive supplies and contracting for spot markets is found in numerous 
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comments by producers and some economists in public hearings in 2010 on 
livestock market power conducted by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture 
(USDA) and Justice in Fort Collins, Colorado, and Washington, D.C. (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2010). 
The conventional story for the impact of the secondary market on spot markets 
has been that bids in the spot market are driven downward by the presence of 
a separate packer-owned inventory (see discussion and references in Crespi, 
Saitone, and Sexton (2012)). The economic story that ϐits this view is simple 
enough. A cattle buyer will bid less in the spot market when its demand for 
cattle is split between the spot market and a contract market. The presence of 
the contract market shifts the buyer’s valuation of the marginal product so that 
it intersects the marginal acquisition curve at a lower point. Rogers and Sexton 
(1994) warned the profession against the misuse of simple theorems in not-
so-simple agricultural markets. While the type of textbook shift just described 
may in fact occur, we demonstrate in this brief note that the relationship is not 
so straightforward when the spot market is best described as an auction. We 
present an analytical model of ϐirst-price sealed-bid strategies in the presence of 
captive supplies that can be used as the basis for future research of such markets.
The equilibrium bidding strategy for a ϐirst-price sealed-bid auction without 
incorporation of captive supplies is well known. It was ϐirst described by 
Vickrey (1961) and later expanded by Riley and Samuelson (1981) into its 
textbook form (see, for example, Krishna (2002) and Menezes and Monteiro 
(2005)). The claim of producers is that captive supplies lower the amounts of 
bids made in the spot market. This seems like common sense, but we ϐind that 
the mechanism is more complicated. Consequently, a cursory understanding of 
how to adapt the auction framework to incorporate captive supplies, which has 
not been done for cattle auctions, is important for the present discussion.
The Model
In our model, M packers obtain a supply of cattle from contracts and purchase 
cattle in a spot market via a competitive process in which bids are submitted as 
private information to a seller, which chooses the highest bid. The spot-market 
supply for a given packer is stochastic; it depends on how many cattle are left 
unpurchased through the contract markets and on the outcome of bids placed 
in the spot auction.
Following the ϐirst-price sealed-bid approach, we choose a format in which 
bidders know the distribution function of each other’s values but draw their 
own values independently (independent private values). We do not incorporate 
learning, updating of information, or correlation in the valuations and do 
not allow updating of the bids, which does occur in some livestock auctions. 
We assume that the buyers (packers) are risk-neutral. Because only the spot 
market is stochastic over the bids, the supply of spot market cattle, qs, is taken 
as the residual from the contracted supply. With total supply set to 1, the spot 
market supply is represented by qs = 1 − qc with s and c denoting spot and 
contract supplies.
Let Ri denote the independent private valuation that packer i has for cattle for 
any R ≥ 0. One could consider Ri as packer i’s valuation of its marginal product 
of the cattle. It could be that the boxed-beef price less the packer-speciϐic 
marketing cost varies by packer. Or the output price or marketing cost alone 
could vary by packer. Regardless, when the cost and/or price vary by packer, our 
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assumption is that it is due to ϐirm-speciϐic production features or otherwise 
differentiated outputs.  This valuation is the key to the equilibrium bidding 
strategies of the packers in the model. Each packer knows its value of R and 
the cumulative distribution for any value less than or equal to some number, 
x, which is denoted as F(x), and the density of the distribution, f (x) = F (´x). We 
are interested in identifying the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding 
strategy, p(R): the strategy that the packer believes all of the other packers in 
the market are following and for which it must determine the best response. 
Because all of the packers follow the same strategy, we begin by examining the 
perspective of a single packer.
Consider packer i = 1. If packer 1 bids p1 in the spot market, it procures the 
cattle only if p1 > max{p2, . . . , pM} and receives no cattle otherwise. In the case 
of a tie, we assume there is some method for determining the winner, such as 
a coin ϐlip or that the cattle go unsold into another round; we focus only on 
rounds in which an unequivocal sale is made. Let packer 1 have a valuation for 
the cattle of R = R1 with similar notation for packers 2 through M such that the 
expected proϐit for packer 1 is
(1)  π(p1) = π(R, p1, p(R)) = (R − p1) Prob(p1 > max{p(R2), . . . , p(RM)})qs
 + (R − p1)qc = (R − p1) Prob(p1 > p(R2), . . . , p1 > p(RM))qs + (R − p1)qc.
Supply in the spot market is the residual of total supply minus the contract 
supply, which makes the contract supply a function of the spot bid: qc ≡ qc(p1) 
and qs = 1 − qc(p1).
When p1 ∈ [pl, ph] and x ∈ [0, Rh] where l and h denote the lowest and 
highest prices/valuations and the bidding function is strictly increasing and 
differentiable, then some p1 = p(x) must exist. Therefore, instead of choosing 
the optimal bid price (as in a Bertrand model), we can instead maximize 
expected proϐit in terms of the bidders’ valuations. The expected proϐit is
(2)  πˆ (x) = π(p(x)) = (R − p(x))Prob(p(x) > p(R2), . . . , p(x) > p(RM))qs + (R − p(x))qc.
Because the bids are increasing in x and all players follow the same strategy in 
equilibrium, we can rewrite equation 2 as
 πˆ (x) = (R − p(x)) Prob(x > R2, . . . , x > RM)qs + (R − p(x))qc.
Finally, independent private-value auctions assume that all bids are 
independent and identically distributed. This convention allows us to rewrite 
the expected proϐit function yet again as
(3) πˆ (x) = (R − p(x)) F(x)M–1qs + (R − p(x))qc.
Deriving the ϐirst-order condition of equation 3 yields
(4) πˆ ´(x) = (R − p(x))(M − 1)f (x)F(x)M–2qs − p´(x)F(x)M–1qs
 − qc´(·)p´(x)(R − p(x))F(x)M–1 − p´(x)qc
 + (R − p(x))qc´(·)p´(x) = 0.
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Because of the monotonic transformation from expected proϐit in equation 1 
to the proϐit function in terms of valuations in equation 2 and because bid 
prices are increasing and continuously differentiable in x, any x that satisϐies 
the ϐirst-order condition of equation 4 will correspond with a value of R that 
likewise maximizes equation 3 in a symmetric equilibrium: πˆ ´(x = R) = 0. Using 
this, we rearrange equation 4 into
(5) p´(R)F(R)M–1qs + p´(R)qc = (R − p(R))(M − 1)f(R) F(R)M–2qs 
 +  (R − p(R))qc (´·)p´(R) 
 − qc (´·)p´(R)(R − p(R))F(R)M–1.
To simplify the exposition, let Θ = p(R)F(R)M–1qs + p(R)qc. Next, we differentiate Θ 
with respect to the underlying packer valuation as in equation 6:
(6) dΘ / dR = p´(R)F(R)M–1qs + p´(R)qc + (M − 1)p(R)f(R)F(R)M–2qs
 − p(R)F(R)M–1qc (´·)p´(R) + p(R)qc (´·)p´(R).
Combining equations 5 and 6 yields
 dΘ / dR = (M − 1)p(R)F(R)M–2 f(R)qs − p(R)F(R)M–1qc´(·)p (´R)
 + p(R)qc´(·)p (´R) + (R − p(R))(M − 1)f(R)F(R)M–2qs
 + (R − p(R))qc (´·)p´(R) − qc (´·)p´(R)(R − p(R))F(R)M–1.
After cancelling like terms and rearranging, we derive equation 7.
(7) dΘ / dR = R[M − 1] f(R)F(R)M–2qs + Rqc (´·)p´(R)[1 − F(R)M–1]
According to the fundamental theorem of calculus, if u is continuous on [a,b], 
the function v deϐined by v(x) = ∫axu(t)dt is continuous on [a,b] and differentiable 
on (a,b) and v´(x) = u(x). Using this result yields
p(R)F(R)M–1qs + p(R)qc = ∫
0
Rx[M − 1]f(x)F(x)M–2qs  + xqc´(x)p´(x)[1 − F(x)M–1]dx
and the equilibrium bidding strategy in the presence of contracted cattle is 
given by the implicit relationship deϐined in equation 8:
(8) p(R) =
∫
0
Rx(M − 1)[f(x)F(x)M–2qs]dx + ∫
0
Rxqc´(x)p´(x)[1 − F(x)M–1]dx
.
(1 − qc)F(R)M–1+ qc
Though implicitly deϐined, equation 8 identiϐies the necessary components 
of the bid. For example, a researcher who wants to consider the empirical 
impact of captive supplies on spot prices must include (at a minimum) the 
number of packers, M; some proxy for valuation, R, such as the boxed-beef 
price; the quantity of cattle comprising the spot (qs) and captive (qc) supplies; 
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the likelihood and distribution of packer wins, f(·) and F(·); and the slope of 
the captive supply curve, qc´(·).
An informal proof of the mathematical procedure is easy to demonstrate. 
Consider a case in which there is no contract market so that qc = 0 and qs = 1. 
In that case, equation 8 becomes the well-known equilibrium bid price for a 
model of an independent private-value ϐirst-price sealed-bid auction (Riley and 
Samuelson 1981):
p(R) =
∫
0
Rx[M − 1][f(x)F(x)M–2]dx
.
F(R)M–1
Discussion
Because we have derived the bid function of equation 8 in terms of the 
underlying value, R, we cannot further solve the strategy without additional 
information about the auction’s density function and the contract-supply 
curve. Such information is obtainable. All that would be needed to solve 
equation 8 either explicitly or numerically is the form for both of those 
functions or reasonable assumptions. Therefore, equation 8 provides a basis 
for a fuller investigation of the impact of captive supplies on spot market bids. 
And even without such additional information, we can discern some of the 
impacts of the presence of captive supplies.
We ϐind that the presence of contracts can lower the equilibrium bid price. 
The numerator in equation 8 becomes smaller and the denominator becomes 
larger as the contract quantity, qc, increases (F(·) ≤ 1) when assuming that the 
supply curve for captive supplies is non-negative (qc´(·) ≥ 0) and the elasticity 
is more or less constant. These are not unreasonable assumptions. 
What about the hypotheses that captive supplies increase packers’ 
market power? In this case, the appearance of contract supplies in both the 
numerator and the denominator identiϐies an intricacy that goes beyond the 
notion that captive supplies simply lead to fewer cattle in the spot market. 
A closer examination of equation 8 shows that the contracts are tied in less 
obvious ways with the “normal” market power that oligopsony bidders wield 
in the spot market.
To elucidate this relationship, we use integration by parts in which
∫a
budz = uz|ab − ∫abzdu 
to further explore equation 8. Letting 
dz = (M − 1)f(x)F(x)M–2(1 − qc)dx,
z = F(x)M–1(1 − qc), du = dx, and u = x yields equation 9.
(9) ∫
0
Rx(M − 1)f(x)F(x)M–2(1 − qc)dx
 = xF(x)M–1(1 − qc)|0R − ∫0RF(x)M–1(1 − qc)dx
 = RF(R)M–1(1 − qc) − ∫
0
RF(x)M–1(1 − qc)dx
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Replacing the numerator of equation 8 with equation 9 gives an implicit 
function for the amount of bid shading due to market power: R − p(R).
(10)   p(R) =
RF(R)M–1(1 − qc) − ∫
0
R[F(x)M–1(1 − qc)]dx  + ∫
0
R xqc´(x)p´(x)[1 − F(x)M–1]dx
.
(1 − qc)F(R)M–1 + qc
If the contract supplies are zero, we can explicitly solve for the bid shading that 
would normally occur in the spot market:
(11) p(R) = R − 
∫
0
R[F(x)M–1]dx
.
F(R)M–1
Comparing equation 10 to equation 11 shows that not all of the bid shading 
is due to the presence of contracts. The ratio to the right of the minus sign in 
equation 11 is the amount of bid shading in the auction for spot cattle if there 
are no captive supplies. Hence, equation 10 provides the basis for further 
investigation of a rather complicated relationship between captive supplies 
and market power that previously has been discussed mostly in terms of the 
conventional wisdom that market power increases in the presence of captive 
supplies. Equation 10 shows that increased bid shading is one possible outcome 
but certainly not the only one. Thus, it appears that an empirical investigation 
of the effects of captive supplies might be preferable and that the relationships 
in equations 8 and 10 should be considered when modeling such studies.
This brief note provides the foundation for a formal, analytical model of a 
ϐirst-price sealed-bid cattle auction in the presence of captive supplies. It is 
offered in an effort to provide researchers with a means by which to analyze 
such markets more fully and thus better understand the intricate relationship 
between captive supplies and spot-market cattle prices.
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